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A common view of consciousness is that our mind presents emotions, experiences, and
images in an internal mental (re-)presentation space which in a state of wakefulness
is triggered by the world outside. Consciousness can be deﬁned as the observation of
this inner mental space. We propose a new model, in which the state of the conscious
observer is deﬁned by the observer’s mental position and focus of attention. The mental
position of the observer can either be within the mental self (intrapersonal space), in the
mental outer world (extrapersonal space) or in an empathic connection, i.e., within the
intrapersonal space of another person (perspective taking). The focus of attention can be
directed toward the self or toward the outside world. This mental space model can help
us to understand the patterns of relationships and interactions with other persons as they
occur in social life. To investigate the neurophysiological correlates and discriminability
of the different mental states, we conducted an EEG experiment measuring the brain
activity of 16 subjects via 64 electrodes while they engaged in different mental positions
(intrapersonal, extrapersonal, perspective taking)with different attentional foci (self, object).
Compared to externalmental locations, internal ones showed signiﬁcantly increased alpha2
power, especially when the observer was focusing on an object. Alpha2 and beta2 were
increased in the empathic condition compared to the extrapersonal perspective. Delta
power was signiﬁcantly higher when the attentional focus was directed toward an object
in comparison to the participant’s own self. This exploratory study demonstrates highly
signiﬁcant differences between various mental locations and foci, suggesting that the
proposed categories of mental location and intra- and interpersonal attentional foci are
not only helpful theoretical concepts but are also physiologically relevant and therefore
may relate to basic brain processing mechanisms.
Keywords: mental perspectives, attentional focus, EEG, intrapersonal space, empathy
INTRODUCTION
Continuously and with increasing interest, the scientiﬁc ﬁelds of
philosophy and neuroscience are concentrating on the study of
the phenomenon of consciousness. Research on altered states of
consciousness,meditation, sleep, and out-of-body experiences has
become popular in the scientiﬁc community. However, there is still
a lack of understanding the links between consciousness as a ﬁrst-
person experience and the variety of related psychophysiological
results. One of the most challenging problems arises from the cat-
egorical incongruences between the concepts of subjective mental
experience and the physiological description of the brain. Efforts
to approach the problem have been made by Damasio (1999) and
Metzinger (2009), among others. Physiological measurements can
also be used to justify psychological concepts if their physiologi-
cal correlates discriminate those concepts. The aim of the present
study was to contribute to a new mental model with electrophysio-
logical data as correlates. This model was termed Boundary-Based
Awareness Model (BBAM; Blaser, 2011, 2012, 2013) and assumes
a structure for the relationship between the observer and the
observed mental (re-)presentation that distinguishes between var-
ious mental positions of the observer as follows: (1) the inner self
model, (2) the physical world model, and (3) empathic connection
with other individuals. The model further distinguishes between
the corresponding attentional foci. Although the BBAM has been
conﬁrmedby two questionnaires, namely the boundary protection
scale (BPS; Blaser et al., 2014b) and the interpersonal attention
management inventory (IAMI; Blaser et al., 2014a), the physio-
logical role of these mental perspectives has never been studied
before. This was the focus of the study presented here. As a ﬁrst
step, this study is an exploratory approach that might generate
hypotheses, but it was not designed to give clear evidence of the
assumed underlying processes.
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL WORLD
Fundamentally, consciousness is a phenomenon that occurs in
a subjective mental domain. It may be regarded as the system-
immanent view of neuronal information processing. Therefore, to
better understand the intriguing question of how we perceive and
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understand the physical world and also another person’s mind, it
is helpful to presume the model of an inner space of the mind
and an inner self. Early on, James (1892) distinguished between
different kinds of self, such as the physical self, the mental self
and the spiritual self. These distinctions seem to reappear in
recent concepts of self as discussed in neuroscience (Panksepp,
1998; Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000; Churchland, 2002; Kelley
et al., 2002; Turk et al., 2003; Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Dalgleish,
2004; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). In modern neuroscience
and neurophilosophy, a common view is that our mind repre-
sents emotions, experiences and images in an internal mental
(re-)presentation space, which in a state of wakefulness is triggered
by the outside world (Damasio, 1999; Blaser, 2008; Metzinger,
2009; Hinterberger, 2011). The sensory system can be seen as
the physical interface which enables us to come into contact with
objects, events and even the emotional contents of other people
apart from us. Sensory information becomes entangled with the
currentmind state, creating the present experiencewithin an inner
mental space. For example, the interaction of the mental self with
the mental outside world plays a crucial role in the new under-
standing of schizophrenia (Taylor, 2011). However, using this
model for consciousness, it should be noted that being conscious
is not just related to the existence of such an inner representation.
Moreover, consciousness requires an observer and therefore can
be deﬁned as the observation of this inner mental space. While
the observer him/herself remains abstract, the self is represented
in such a spatial model as the self-model as described by Damasio
(1999) or Metzinger (2009). The self can be thought of as part
of the inner representation space, more or less separated from
the world model that carries those observed objects which are
assessed as being separate from our own body. In fact the con-
cept of the self involves a number of different brain functions
depending on whether we speak of a biographical self, the cogni-
tive image of the self or the self as an embodied sensory perception.
In this context we do not differentiate those aspects because they
all might be present to some extent when a person is asked to
observe him/herself.
SELF AND OTHER
The mental self can be thought of as embedded in an intercon-
nected fashion within the mental representation space (Damasio,
1999; Northoff et al., 2006). Thus, in analogy to the physical body
in which the skin is the boundary that separates us from the out-
side world, a mental boundary can be attributed to the mental
self. Psychotherapists already work with this model and often
share a common understanding when speaking about thick and
thin boundaries (Tausk, 1992). Accordingly, a protective mental
boundary would mean that our mental self is clearly separated
from the mental outer world, while in individuals with a blurred
boundary, the self and the outer worldmay overlap and sometimes
cannot be clearly distinguished from each other.
The outer world does not only contain more or less meaningful
objects. Moreover, social life occurs in this realm, and therefore
the mental world model is ﬁlled with representatives and concepts
of other people one knows. This could explain why therapists
often realize that people with thin boundaries sometimes have
difﬁculties with the distinction between emotions, feelings and
thoughts belonging to them and those of another person. The
Boundary Protection Scale (BPS-20) is a psychometric instrument
for determining the properties of an individual’s mental bound-
ary (Blaser et al., 2014b). The ability to read the mental states of
a fellow human is called mentalizing (Fonagy et al., 2002; Allen
et al., 2008). The neural basis of mentalizing and how we distin-
guish between the self and the other has been studied by many
authors (Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004; Frith and Frith, 2006a,b; Uddin et al., 2007; Castiello et al.,
2010). Special ways of understanding others are represented by
compassion (Gusnard et al., 2001; Goetz et al., 2010; Klimecki
et al., 2013), empathy (Singer, 2006; Lamm et al., 2007; Hooker
et al., 2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009) and theory of mind (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998; Vogeley, 2001; Gallagher and Frith, 2003;
Völlm et al., 2006). They are, as will be described later on, expres-
sions of different mental perspectives toward the self and the
other.
CONSCIOUS OBSERVATION/MENTAL FOCUS AND LOCATION
In this model the “conscious observer” in us is neither identical
with the self, nor is it a part of the world, but its mental represen-
tation can be attached to or even identiﬁed with one of them. In
the spatial model of consciousness described above, at least two
properties can be attributed to the conscious observer, thus deﬁn-
ing his/her state: the mental position or location and the focus
or direction of attention1. Those properties deﬁne the mental
viewpoint or perspective.
According to our model, there are at least three places in which
the observer can be located: (1) within and in connection with
the mental self-construct, which we call the intrapersonal space
or internal self-referential perspective, (2) within the outer world,
free and independent in the mental space which we call the extrap-
ersonal space or external perspective, and (3) perspective taking,
i.e., an empathic connection to another person which can be
either cognitive or affectively embodied (Blaser, 2008, 2012, 2013).
Accordingly, the focus of attention can be directed either toward
the self, i.e., the intrapersonal space, or toward the world, i.e., the
extrapersonal space or another person within the extrapersonal
space. Both the mental position and focus of attention deﬁne the
mental perspective of a conscious observation. The combinations
of the various mental locations and foci result in ten different per-
spectives, listed in Table 1. They represent themodes postulated by
the BBAM (Blaser, 2011, 2012, 2013). To test the spatial attention
model on another level, the authors developed a questionnaire,
the IAMI. The validation of this new self-rating instrument con-
ﬁrms the concept of an intrapersonal space, an extrapersonal space
and the extrapersonal mental space of a fellow human. The IAMI
constitutes a tool for assessment of the ability to manage the var-
ious states in daily life (Blaser et al., 2014a; see Materials and
Methods).
With this mental space model and its interpersonal frame-
work we attempt to reduce mindfulness, compassion, cognitive
self-perception, theory of mind, theory–theory and empathy
1These properties of mental location and attentional focus in a mental space might
be metaphorically related to the physical properties position and momentum in the
physical space-time model. This would imply that mental location and attentional
focus are complementary mental categories.
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Table 1 | Overview of mental localization, attentional focus, and processing modality according to the BBAM.
No. Mode Mental location Attentional focus Processing modality
(cognitive or affective)
1 IS Intrapersonal Own self Affective (mindful
self-centered interoception)
2 IF Intrapersonal Object in the outer world Affective (mindful)
3 IP Intrapersonal Another person whose mental location is
inside his/her intrapersonal space
Affective (compassion)
4 OS Extrapersonal Own self Cognitive self-perception
5 OF Extrapersonal Object in the outer world Cognitive
6 EcogF Perspective taking Object in the outer world via another
person whose mental location is in the
outer world
Cognitive (theory of mind)
7 EcogP Perspective taking Another person whose mental location is
inside his/her intrapersonal space
Cognitive (theory–theory)
8 ES Perspective taking Own self Affective (empathy)
9 EaffF Perspective taking Object in the outer world Affective (empathy)
10 EaffP Perspective taking Another person in his/her intrapersonal
space
Affective (empathy)
The ﬁrst letter in the mode designation codes the mental location while the second letter codes the attentional focus. Some states are perceived more affectively
while others are perceived more cognitively.
Mental locations: I, intrapersonal; O, extrapersonal; E, perspective taking (empathic). Attentional foci: S, self; F, object outside of the self; P, other person.
to a common denominator (Blaser, 2012). This novel theoret-
ical framework weaves mental life and interpersonal dynamics
together. It enables us to understand the patterns of relation-
ships and what occurs when we come into contact with another
person.
NEUROSCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS
Althoughwe donot intend to discuss all the neuroscientiﬁc aspects
of these concepts we do aim to present some neuroscientiﬁc
ﬁndings relating to the proposed concepts.
The discriminability of mental foci has been shown previously
in studies on self-perception, for example the involvement of cor-
tical midline structures in self-reference as seen by neuroimaging
studies (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004).
In earlier research it could be shown that the ﬁrst-person per-
spective and the third-person perspective (comparable with the
mental locations “intrapersonal space” and “external intraper-
sonal space” in our model) rely on differential neural processes.
For example, Vogeley et al. (2004) were able to identify differ-
ent brain regions activated by observation tasks when researching
mental states of the ﬁrst- versus the third-person perspec-
tive), while Ruby and Decety (2001) used PET measurements
to explore the cognitive and neural processing involved in
agency.
Some of the modes listed in Table 1 often occur in the rest-
ing state, i.e., while no external task that demands a large amount
of resources from the brain functions is being performed. Dur-
ing resting conditions, a person’s mind is usually engaged in
information processing, memorization, self-referential thoughts,
evaluations, etc. All these tasks require the activation of so-called
resting state networks in the brain. One of them is the default
mode network (DMN; Raichle et al., 2001), which comprises a
number of non-goal-oriented mental processing functions such as
task-independent introspection or self-referential thoughts. From
the literature we could not decide whether the DMN relates more
to a self-directed attentional focus or an embodied self-centered
mental location. Therefore, one could expect the DMN to be
active during the intrapersonal modes but also in self-directed
modes.
In this study we focus on the correlates with EEG data. This
necessitates an introduction to some related concepts with the
corresponding EEG results.
Intrapersonal space (I)
Jann et al. (2010) and Mantini et al. (2007) described EEG cor-
relates of the resting state networks. They found that the DMN,
which we would assume to be active in intrapersonal mental loca-
tions, correlated with increased frontocentral alpha1, posterior,
and occipital alpha2 and parietal beta1. Delta and theta were
decreased. Ward (2003) also reports that alpha could increase dur-
ing attentional tasks in order to avoid distraction, and alpha has
also been shown to be strongerwhen attentionwas directed toward
internal mental imagery rather than external input (Cooper et al.,
2003).
Extrapersonal space (O)
In contrast, the extrapersonal modes require adoption of an
external viewpoint and might therefore reduce DMN activity.
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Perspective taking (E)
Perspective taking or imagination of a well-known person is a
memory-related task. Increased theta activity has been found to
be associated with memory functions, i.e., both encoding and
retrieval of information (Klimesch, 1999; Bas¸ar et al., 2000; Ward,
2003).
Attentional focus
A self-directed mental focus could also be part of the DMN
(Knyazev, 2013), leading to decreased delta and theta band activity
and increased frontocentral alpha1, posterior, and occipital alpha2
and parietal beta1 (Mantini et al., 2007; Jann et al., 2010).
Cognitive versus affective processing
As listed in Table 1 some of the intrapersonal modes are attributed
to emotional and affective processing, i.e., all perceptions are
related to the person’s own physical being. In contrast the
extrapersonal modes are attributed to cognitive processing as all
perceptions (of the self, of other persons or of external objects)
are cognitively evaluated. Perspective taking can be cognitive
(theory of mind or theory–theory), but if it occurs with an
empathic attitude and emotions are involved, we treat it as affec-
tive. Electrophysiologically, cognitive processing is associated with
a decrease in alpha band activity and an increase in theta acti-
vations (e.g., Ramos et al., 1993; Klimesch, 1996, 1999). Ray
and Cole (1985) attributed alpha to the attentional aspect and
beta waves to cognitive and emotional processing, with activa-
tion in the temporal areas for emotionally positive or negative
tasks and in the parietal areas for cognitive tasks. The prefrontal
sector is most directly associated with emotion (for an overview
and commentary see Davidson, 2004). There is no consistent
pattern of alpha activity comparing neutral and affective stim-
uli. Aftanas et al. (2002, 2004), for example, found an increase
in posterior and anterior alpha with affective stimuli, whereas
De Cesarei and Codispoti (2011) found a decrease in poste-
rior sites. Uusberg et al. (2013) found enhanced high alpha in
central and parietal areas in late event-related potentials with emo-
tional stimuli, most prominently with aversive stimuli. Müller
et al. (1999) identiﬁed the temporal areas as being associated with
positive (right hemisphere) and negative (left hemisphere) emo-
tions. Regardless of the valence they found enhanced gamma
band power (30–50 Hz) at right frontal electrodes with emo-
tional processing compared to processing of neutral pictures.
Although the ﬁeld of cognitive and affective neuroscience is
large most studies have been performed with visual stimuli,
and a clear correspondent of our tasks could not be found in
the literature. This restricts the formulation of a very speciﬁc
hypothesis.
More detailed relationships between these concepts and the
states examined in our study will be mentioned in the section
“Materials and Methods.”An explicit classiﬁcation of mental loca-
tion, mental foci and their combinations has never been studied
before. However, as these concepts overlap with well-researched
concepts it can be supposed that the modes of the model presented
here discriminate between each other as well.
The aim of the present study was to assess EEG pattern differ-
ences between mental location and the direction of the attentional
focus. The existence of neurophysiological differences between
the mental states deﬁned in the spatial attention concept would
demonstrate as a ﬁrst step the neurophysiological relevance of
this concept. Our hypothesis in this study was that in a guided
exercise the various tasks would not only represent subjectively
different states of consciousness but also show signiﬁcantly differ-
ent patterns on spectral EEG data. This was tested by measuring
64 channels of EEG in 16 participants who were guided through
six of the mental states from Table 1 to investigate the differences
between mental locations and also between attentional foci. A
more speciﬁc formulation of the hypothesis is given in the section
“Materials and Methods.”
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen healthy participants (10 female, 6 male) aged between
33 and 70 years (mean: 52 years) took part in one experimental
session and gave written informed consent. All of them had previ-
ously participated in a workshop in which they had practiced the
different mental states through the IAMEx as presented below. To
verify that the studied sample showed no pathological conspicu-
ity but rather increased mental abilities all participants completed
the following questionnaires: the IAMI, BPS-20, Revised Symp-
tom Check List (SCL-90R), and freiburg mindfulness inventory
(FMI). The study was approved by the legal ethics committee of
the University Clinic Regensburg.
STUDY DESIGN
Assessment through questionnaires
Boundary Protection Scale (BPS-20). Blaser constructed the BPS-
20 to assess the ability of a person to maintain his/her personal
boundaries. It consists of 20 items, six of them framed negatively,
which are summed to yield a single boundaryprotectionvalue. The
higher this value, theworse is the boundary protection. Ratings are
given on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). The
internal consistency of this scale was found to be 0.71 (Cronbach’s
alpha) in a validation study with 1,089 participants (Blaser et al.,
2014b).
Interpersonal attention management inventory (IAMI). This
consists of 50 items dealing with everyday life experiences lead-
ing to 10 factor items assessing the ability to control the direction
of the attentional focus and the mental location. As each of the 10
subfactors is related to one of three mental locations it is possible
to construct three major factors assessing the ability to manage
the inner, the outer and the empathic mental perspective. Ratings
are given on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always).
The IAMI was validated in the same study as the BPS-20 involv-
ing 1,089 participants and showed an internal consistency of 0.87
(Cronbach’s alpha; Blaser et al., 2014a).
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI). Mindfulness, with its
subfactors presence and acceptance, was measured using the 14-
item version of the FMI (Buchheld et al., 2001; Buchheld and
Walach, 2002; Walach et al., 2006). The FMI assesses self-ratings
of awareness and non-judgment of present-moment experiences
(Buchheld et al., 2001; Buchheld and Walach, 2002; Heidenreich
et al., 2006; Walach et al., 2006; Kohls et al., 2009). Sample items
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are “I am open to the experience of the present moment” and “I
accept unpleasant experiences.” Ratings are given on a scale from
1 (no, never) to 4 (yes, always). The global FMI scale yielded an
internal consistency of 0.83 (Cronbach’s alpha), while the two
subfactors only reached 0.71 (presence) and 0.64 (acceptance;
Kohls et al., 2009). The validation study with 1,089 participants
showed an internal consistency of 0.83 (Cronbach’s alpha) for
the FMI.
Revised Symptom Check List (SCL-90R). Psychopathological
symptoms were assessed using the SCL-90R self-rating ques-
tionnaire (Franke, 2002) with 90 items focusing on 9 scales.
Additionally, three global factors can be calculated, namely a
Global Severity Index, the Positive Symptom Distress Index and
the Positive Symptom Total. In our analysis, all of the values were
transformed into normalized t-values with a mean of 50 and a
standard deviation of 10. Cronbach’s alpha was reported to be in
the range between 0.75 and 0.97.
The Interpersonal Attention Management Exercise (IAMEx)
For therapeutic treatment Blaser has developed a mental exercise
termed the IAMEx. The IAMEx is used to train voluntary achieve-
ment of the various states and representation modes. This exercise
was practiced with all participants and comprised the main part of
this study. It provided the various mental states for the neurophys-
iological discrimination of different mental locations, attentional
foci and processing modes. For the purposes of experimental con-
solidationwe restricted our study to themental foci self and object.
Therefore, only six of the mental perspectives taken from the list in
Table 1 were studied physiologically by EEG measurements dur-
ing the instructed exercise. Explicitly, in our study the participants
were guided through the states displayed in Figure 1, characterized
as follows:
Mode IS. This involves directing the focus of one’s attention at
the internal from within the intrapersonal space (self-centered
introspection). The bodily sensation is the experience of being
present in the moment of subjective experience as it occurs (Stern,
2004). This also relates to so-called focusing, amethod that enables
a person to get in touch with his/her emotions physically through
bodily experience (Gendlin, 1998). This is related to the theory of
Damasio (1999), who coined the phrase “I feel, therefore I am.”
Instruction. Try to center yourself. Perceive your breath. Are you
breathing deeply or superﬁcially, slow or fast, with the chest, with
the belly orwith both? There is no need for you to change anything,
only to perceive. Are you aware of any feelings and do you notice
bodily sensations? Where do you perceive something? Yield to it.
Mode IF. Directing the attention from the intrapersonal space to
the exterior world, one is still connected to the physical body in a
mindful way. To look outside from within involves a bi-focussed
mode of perception, i.e., perceiving the outer world and simulta-
neously feeling one’s own bodily sensations. This mental state is
central to mindfulness-based therapy forms (Segal et al., 2002).
Instruction. Now turn your attention to the ﬂowers (which stand
on a table 3 m away from the participant). Remain self-centered
and mindful. What changes occur in your bodily sensations when
you perceive the plants mindfully?
Mode OS. By crossing one’s own self-boundary with the location
of attention from inside to outside one arrives in a cognitive men-
tal state, disconnected from the inner world and bodily sensations;
functions such as the working memory, problem solving, ana-
lyzing, and planning of processes are activated. Simultaneously,
the DMN activity should be reduced. That enables cognitive self-
perception, i.e., to look from the outside, from a meta-position,
at one’s own feelings. It is associated with the normal forms of
dissociation in contrast to the pathological forms (Putnam, 1997).
Previc (2009, 2011) associates distant extrapersonal states such
as dreaming, hallucinations, out-of-body experiences or religious
activity with ventral dopaminergic pathways.
Instruction. Imagine you’re standing on a white sheet of paper
which lies 4 m in front of you, looking from there to yourself
sitting on the chair with the electrode cap on your head. What are
you seeing? How is this for you?
Mode OF. As with mode OS the mental location is in the extrap-
ersonal space, but the focus of attention is an object in the outer
world. This is associated with cognitive control, for example as
described by Herwig et al. (2007), which is important for an objec-
tive viewpoint toward an object in the outer world. The intended
state does not require a self and is therefore called a“selﬂess”2 state.
Instruction. Imagine you’re still standing on the white sheet of
paper, now looking from there to the ﬂowers. How is it now, when
you’re looking from there to the ﬂowers?
Mode EF. As with modes OS and OF the mental location is in the
extrapersonal space, but the focus of attention are the thoughts
of another person about an object. This is known as the theory
of mind or cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009) in the
sense of thinking about the thoughts of another person (Gopnik
and Wellman, 1992).
Instruction. Imagine a previously determined person now enters
the room and positions herself to the left of you on a green sheet
of paper. What is she thinking, when she is looking at the ﬂowers
from there? What do you guess she is thinking looking at the
ﬂowers?
Mode ES. With one’s mental location in an external intraper-
sonal space and the focus on one’s own person, one can look in
an empathic way at one’s own feelings. In contrast to cognitive
empathy and the mirror neuron system, which displays a form
of affective or emotional empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009),
for some authors this is (together with modes Eaff F and Eaff P,
see Table 1) the “real” form of empathy, whereas the other forms
(modes IP, EcogF and EcogP, see Table 1) are not denoted with
the term “empathy” (e.g., Singer and Lamm, 2009). This can be
described as looking through the emotional glasses of another per-
son and can be achieved by asking the question “how would it be
for me?” (Lamm et al., 2007).
2We have used quotation marks to indicate that the term “selﬂess” should not be
construed with its usual meaning of “altruistic.”
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the 6 task conditions in this study. Participants were asked to adopt three different mental locations in which they focused either
on their own body or on ﬂowers in the room. The states are identiﬁed by two-letter acronyms describing location and focus.
Instruction. Imagine the person takes one step away from you and
you take her place on the green sheet of paper and empathize
with her. What is she feeling, when she looks from there at you
sitting on the chair with the electrode cap? What are your bodily
sensations when looking through her emotional glasses at yourself
sitting there?
Experimental procedure
A sequence of nine different instructions led the participant
through all states of interest within one IAMEx as listed in Table 2.
The experimental sessionwas subdivided into three EEG recording
phases. The ﬁrst phase consisted of a short reference measurement
with 2 min of the participant sitting relaxed with open eyes, 2 min
of sitting with closed eyes and another 2 min of reading a text from
an arbitrary book. Recording phases 2 and 3 were carried out with
open eyes. Each of them consisted of a guided IAMEx according
to Table 2. After each instruction the corresponding state should
be maintained for about 1 min, so the whole exercise took a bit
less than 15 min including the time for the instructions. Record-
ing phase 3 repeated phase 2 in order to increase statistical power
and possibly test for retest stability. After both phases 2 and 3 the
participant was asked on a self-rating scale how well he/she was
able to fulﬁll each of the experimental tasks 2–8 in Table 2.
Experimental setup
All physiological data were recorded with a 72-channel QuickAmp
ampliﬁer system (BrainProducts GmbH,Munich, Germany). EEG
was measured using an actively shielded 64-channel electrode cap
with Ag/AgCl electrodes which were arranged according to the
international 10/10 system (ANT, Netherlands). The system was
grounded at the participant’s shoulder. Data were recorded with a
commonaverage reference andﬁltered in a range fromDCto70Hz
at a sampling rate of 250 Hz and 22-bit resolution. For correction
of eye movement and blink artifacts, a vertical and horizontal
electrooculogram was measured by placing two electrodes above
and below one eye and two electrodes on the left and right side
of the eyes. Respiration rate was measured with a respiration belt
and skin conductance on the second and third ﬁnger of the non-
dominant hand. Additionally, an electrocardiogram (ECG) was
assessed with two electrodes. In this report we only focus on the
EEG data.
At least two experimenters were present. One of them (K.B.)
served as instructor guiding the participants through the IAMEx.
The other experimenter was monitoring the raw data during the
recording and writing a time stamp protocol taking note of the
start and end times, i.e., when the instruction was completed and
when the next instruction was started. The participant was seated
in a comfortable chair in one corner of the room. From there
he/she could view a white and a green sheet of paper on the ﬂoor
as well as a vase with ﬂowers on a small board as speciﬁed in the
IAMEx (see instructions above). All three objects were about 3–4
meters away from the participant and about 0.5–1.5 meters from
each other.
EEG DATA ANALYSIS
EEG signal processing
The whole data analysis was performed using Matlab. After
detrending the DC recorded EEG data sets all EEG channels were
corrected for eye movements using a linear correction algorithm
which detects eye blinks and movement events and uses those
periods todetermine a correction factor for each channel. The elec-
trooculogram was multiplied by this factor and then subtracted
from the EEG according to Gratton et al. (1983).
A power spectrum time series was calculated using the fast
Fourier transform (FFT). FFT was applied to the windowed EEG
time series, which was convolved using a Nutall window and
shifted in steps of 0.5 s. A window size of 2 s was chosen for
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Table 2 | Sequence of different tasks in the IAMEx.
No. Task Mental
location
Attentional
focus
Processing
modality
1 Resting with eyes open U U U
2 Intrapersonal mental location observing the self from within and one’s own
body (mindful interoception, self-centered state)
I S A
3 Intrapersonal mental location observing an object in the outer environment I F A
Leaving the inner boundary
4 Extrapersonal mental location observing the self from an outside viewpoint
(cognitive self-perception)
O S C
5 Extrapersonal mental location, observing an object in the outer environment
(“selﬂess” state)
O F C
6 Taking over the cognitive perspective of another person and observing the
same object (theory of mind)
E F C
7 Merging with another person observing the self and physical sensations
(empathic self-perception)
E S A
Approaching the self and reconnecting
8 Intrapersonal mental location experiencing one’s own physical sensations and
observing the self (mindful interoception)
I S A
9 Resting with eyes open U U U
The right columns indicate the mental location and the focus which deﬁne a task.
Location: U, undeﬁned; I, inside; O, outside; E, perspective taking (empathic).
Focus: U, undeﬁned; S, self or own physical sensations; F = ﬂowers.
Processing modality: U, undeﬁned; A, affective; C, cognitive.
calculation of the FFT frequency coefﬁcients. This resulted in 140
FFT frequency bins from 0–70 Hz and a resolution of 0.5 Hz. To
limit the inﬂuence of high-amplitude artifacts the spectral ampli-
tudes were limited to 5 standard deviations. To obtain a measure
of the power spectral density (PSD), FFT values were squared.
The FFT bins were then averaged into 7 standard frequency bands:
delta (1–3.5Hz), theta (4–7.5Hz), alpha1 (8–10Hz), alpha2 (10.5–
12 Hz), beta1, or SMR (12.5–15 Hz), beta2 (15.5–25 Hz), gamma
(25.5–47Hz), and an additional high gamma band (53–70Hz). All
data were visually inspected in a time-frequency-resolved fashion
to detect periods of noise or bad signals in order to control for
bad electrodes or longer periods of EMG noise or other artifacts.
Short-term artifacts were controlled for by the use of medians
as described below. The high gamma band was not expected
to provide reliable information and therefore was only used for
discussion of possible high-frequency artifacts such as muscle ten-
sion, which are normally more visible in the high frequencies.
Thus, for statistical comparison only the ﬁrst seven frequency
bands were considered.
Epoching
Before segmentation of the data streams from the three record-
ing sessions the PSD time trace was detrended in order to be
independent from a possible sequence effect. Then, the data
stream was cut into epochs according to the different task con-
ditions, resulting in six resting state conditions (ﬁve with eyes
open and one with eyes closed), one reading condition and
two times the nine tasks of interest as shown in Table 2. For
temporal averaging of the PSD time traces within each task
epoch all 2 s intervals were averaged. As there were two inter-
vals per second about 120 values were averaged in an epoch of
about 1 min. In order to be robust against rare but possible
high-amplitude artifacts the temporal median was used and the
interquartile range served as a measure for the standard devi-
ation which can be estimated by multiplication by 0.7413 (see
Matlab function iqr). Thus, an average EEG PSD with its stan-
dard deviation was available for each task condition, electrode,
frequency band and participant. Further reduction levels were
achieved by averaging over all electrodes, resulting in the global
band power.
In addition to the six single tasks for the analysis of loca-
tions and foci, three conditions were added with speciﬁc location
only and no speciﬁc focus, i.e., both foci were merged into one
epoch. Also, to analyze conditions that discriminate between
the two foci only, two conditions were added in which all
locations were merged. As shown in Table 3 the unspeciﬁc
or arbitrary location was indexed with an X as the ﬁrst letter
and the arbitrary focus was indexed with an X as the sec-
ond letter. This resulted in 11 mental conditions of potential
interest.
Statistical comparisons
In order to uncover the speciﬁcities of each condition it was neces-
sary to contrast them with each other. According to our model
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Table 3 | A matrix showing the indices for 11 conditions of various foci
and locations.
Mental location Attentional focus
Self Object Both merged
Intrapersonal IS IF IX
Extrapersonal OS OF OX
Empathic ES EF EX
All merged XS XF –
Location: I, intrapersonal; O, extrapersonal; E, empathic connection; X, all three
locations were merged.
Focus: S, self or own physical sensations; F, ﬂowers; X, both foci were merged.
in Figure 1 two general types of comparisons can be distin-
guished, namely those comparing different locations with each
other and those comparing the different foci. The location com-
parisons aim to distinguish between an internal, external and
empathic mental position. These comparisons were made with
an unspeciﬁc focus and the self- and object-oriented focus, result-
ing in nine comparisons [Table 4(1)]. The distinction between
the object- and self-directed mental focus was calculated for
merged mental locations and for the three speciﬁc locations
[Table 4(2)]. An additional contrast condition was chosen which
should show the difference between a “selﬂess” state, deﬁned
as an outside position with the attention directed toward an
external object, and a self-centered state, deﬁned as an internal
mental position with self-directed awareness. The correspond-
ing category was termed “relatedness” [Table 4(3)]. Finally, as
some of the instructions require cognitive processes and oth-
ers ask for affective and emotional involvement we decided to
contrast the cognitive and affective processing modes by averag-
ing all cognitive tasks (i.e., OS, OF, EF) and all affective tasks
[i.e., IS, IF, ES; Table 4(4)]. Together with one additional com-
parison of the resting state with eyes open versus closed a list
of 16 comparisons or contrasts of interest was available. As
a measure of the difference between tasks within each person
we chose the estimated effect size by using the formalism of
Cohen’s d, however, we used the median of epochs instead of the
mean and an estimated standard deviation using the interquartile
range.
In order to account for the differences in the fulﬁllment of
speciﬁc tasks the effect size of each participant, task, electrode,
and band was multiplied by a self-rating factor speciﬁc for each
task and participant. This self-rating factor was calculated by aver-
aging the self-ratings (1–5) over all single tasks which formed
the task condition and dividing by the average across all task
conditions.
Before calculation of the effect across participants the
Anderson–Darling test of normal distribution was performed,
showing that delta and alpha values in particular were not nor-
mally distributed. As a consequence, a Wilcoxon signed rank
test was applied to the differences in effects corrected for indi-
vidual task fulﬁllment to estimate the signiﬁcances of those task
comparisons.
Further considerations
Correction for multiple comparisons is not trivial as such mea-
sures are highly dependent on each other. Therefore, Bonferroni
correction of signiﬁcance levels would be far too conservative and
wipe out most effects. The false discovery rate (FDR) adjustment
method constitutes a less conservative approach. Based on the
formulas of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Yekutieli and
Benjamini (1999), we applied FDR adjustment to the p-values
across six frequency bands and 15 comparisons. In the results
shown in Figure 2, all values that survived FDR adjustment at the
5% level were marked with a white dot. A pink dot marked those
values with p< 0.01 and a green dot was used to mark marginally
signiﬁcant results with p < 0.06. Thus, the topographic mapping
inFigure 3 of the dotted ﬁelds fromFigure 2might present reliable
positive results.
Table 4 |The contrasted conditions are listed systematically.
Foci
Arbitrary Self Object
(1) Comparisons of locations Intra-extrapersonal IX-OX IS-OS IF-OF
Intrapersonal-empathic IX-EX IS-ES IF-EF
Empathic-extrapersonal EX-OX ES-OS EF-OF
Locations
All locations Inside Outside Empathic
(2) Comparisons of foci Object-self XF–XS IF–IS OF–OS EF–ES
(3) Relatedness “Selﬂess”-self-centered OF-IS
(4) Processing mode Cognitive-affective C–A = (OS + OF + EF)–(IS + IF + ES)
The comparisons in bold are those of special interest which formed the basis of our hypotheses.
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FIGURE 2 | Significances of mean differences between conditions
displayed for the global band power measure. Signiﬁcant contrasts are
shown as red and dark-blue ﬁelds. The white dots indicate that the z -score
remained signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) after FDR adjustment across seven frequency
bands and 16 comparisons. Pink dots were signiﬁcant at p < 0.01, and the
green dots indicate p < 0.06.
HYPOTHESES
(H1) On the global scale, we expected band power differ-
ences in the EEG comparing all mental tasks as shown in
Table 4. Topographic differences were calculated for the
speciﬁc comparisons shown in bold in Table 4. Here, we
assumed that the distinct subjective states of consciousness
would express themselves in discriminable topographic and
spectral EEG patterns. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that
(H2) Different mental locations would present different spectral
EEG patterns. Therefore, the tasks IX, OX, and EX have to
be compared to each other. According to Knyazev (2013),
self-referential processing should show enhanced alpha and
beta oscillations and diminished theta and delta activities.
The same prediction could be made when hypothesizing
that OX tasks reduce DMN activity, which is active in IX
tasks according to Jann et al. (2010).
The EX mode involves memory-related tasks because of
the need to imagine a well-known person and therefore
should exhibit increased theta waves (Ward, 2003).
(H3) Self-directed and object-directed mental foci should show
different EEG patterns. The tasks XF and XS will be con-
trasted. According to Knyazev et al. (2011) extraversion
(possibly similar to XF) could be predicted by increased
posterior and decreased orbitofrontal theta activities. As
self-referential thinking is sometimes associated with the
DMN of the brain it is further hypothesized that the
corresponding EEG characteristics will match those of the
XS state.
(H4) Self and other: this is a special combination of the previ-
ous modes in which a self-concept is not involved at all and
which is expected to be different to a state in which a self-
concept is referenced to itself (OF-IS). Therefore, we would
expect to ﬁnd both the correlates of IX-OX (hypothesis
1) and the correlates of XF-XS (hypothesis 2) in this
mode.
Here also, according to Knyazev (2013), during self-
referential processing alpha and beta oscillations should
increase, while theta and delta activities should be larger
in the “selﬂess” state (Knyazev, 2012).
(H5) As can be seen from Table 1 we ask whether the IAMEx also
presents a discriminable difference between cognitive and
affective processing modes. This is an additional hypothesis
which does not directly relate to the model of focus and
location but is included because of the categorization of the
modes into more affective and more cognitive ones. While
cognitive processing is expected to show decreased alpha
and increased theta band activities, emotional processing
would exhibit increased alpha and right frontal gamma
band oscillations.
(H6) The confounding variables age and gender should not have
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the results.
RESULTS
PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS
The results of the questionnaires were used to characterize the
sample of participants. Therefore, the participants’ responses to
the FMI, BPS-20, and IAMI were compared with the population
means taken from validation studies. Validation of the BPS-20
and IAMI included 1,089 participants, and the SCL-90R was com-
pared with the population means published by Franke (2002). The
results listed in Table 5 reveal our participants as having higher
personal boundary protection compared to the population mean
(d = −1.29) and slightly higher individual attention management
(d = 0.46); in particular, inner boundary management exceeded
that of the normal population (d = 0.79). The participants also
showed higher mindfulness scores (d = 0.45–0.72, depending on
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FIGURE 3 | Comparisons of the most prominent findings depicted as
topographic color maps for all frequency bands. FDR-adjusted signed
p-values resulting from aWilcoxon signed rank test for 16 participants. Red
areas represent a signiﬁcant increase while green/blue signaling represents a
signiﬁcant decrease in spectral power. (A–C) Different mental locations with
an arbitrary focus. (D) Comparison of attentional foci, i.e., the ﬂowers versus
self-directed, independent of the location. (E) Differences between a
“selﬂess” and a self-centered mind set reﬂected by a change in both position
and focus. (F) Contrast between mental processing modes. The asterisks
indicate overall signiﬁcance according to Figure 2.
the factor). Psychopathological symptomsmeasuredwith the SCL-
90R were within the range of the normal population (±1 SD) in
14 of 16 participants. Altogether, our participants formed a psy-
chologically healthy sample with a high mindfulness self-rating
and increased boundary protection as well as increased attention
management abilities.
Task fulﬁllment
The fulﬁllment of each task was rated by the participants on a scale
from 1 to 5. On average, 6.8 of the 16 participants rated the tasks as
having been fulﬁlled with a score of 4.5 or 5; 6.1 of 16 gave a score
of 3.5 or 4; 2.5 of 16 gave a score of 2.5 or 3, and 0.6 of 16 rated
task fulﬁllment with low scores of 1–2. A detailed list for speciﬁc
tasks is shown in Table 6.
GLOBAL EEG DIFFERENCES
General effects
To generally test the differences between the 11 conditions across
participants a non-parametrical Friedman test was applied to the
spectral data of the 16 participants. Electrodes were used as block-
ing factor. All bands presented a highly signiﬁcant effect with
F > 73 and p < 0.001 except for the gamma band, which was
not signiﬁcant. Similarly, a Friedman test was applied to the effect
sizes of the 16 comparisons between tasks with electrodes as block-
ing factor. All bands presented highly signiﬁcant effects (F > 400,
p > 0.001). This allowed for a detailed analysis, and, moreover,
our global hypothesis (H1) was conﬁrmed.
Speciﬁc global analysis
Signiﬁcance values of PSD differences on a global scale (global
band power) of 16 comparisons resulting from a Wilcoxon signed
rank testwith subsequent FDRadjustment of p-values across seven
bands and 16 comparisons are illustrated in Figure 2. The ﬁrst
row shows the trivial result of an “eyes closed vs. open” contrast
leading to a highly signiﬁcant alpha1 (z = 3.46, padj = 0.007)
and alpha2 (z = 3.36, padj = 0.009) power increase in closed eyes
with a simultaneous gamma decrease (z = −2.95, padj = 0.02).
This result will not be discussed further. In all other comparisons
participants had their eyes open.
Mental locations. Contrasting all inside with all outside men-
tal locations showed a signiﬁcant increase in alpha2 (z = 3.21,
padj = 0.012), but also in the beta band, without reaching
the signiﬁcance level of 0.05 after FDR adjustment. Speciﬁ-
cally, this alpha2 increase reached signiﬁcance in the object-
directed contrast IF-OF (z = 2.84, padj = 0.021). There was
no difference in delta power between IS and OS, but it was
signiﬁcantly stronger in empathic self-perception compared to
cognitive self-perception (ES-OS: z = 2.84, padj = 0.021). The
hypothesis (H2) of increased alpha2 was conﬁrmed, while the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 637 | 10
Blaser et al. EEG of mental perspectives
Table 5 | Results of the BPS-20, IAMI, FMI, and SCL-90R questionnaires
from participants in the current study compared with the population
mean.
Inventory (Sub-)
Scale
Study mean
(±Std)
Population
mean
(±Std)*
Effect size
(Cohen’s d)
BPS-20 BPS 51.6 (±10.1) 62.2 (±8.2) −1.29
IAMI Total 186.0 (±19.0) 178.0 (±17.2) 0.46
Inside 57.6 (±4.9) 52.5 (±6.5) 0.79
Outside 77.9 (±8.4) 74.9 (±8.1) 0.37
Empathic 50.4 (±9.0) 50.6 (±7.9) −0.03
FMI Total 42.4 (±4.0) 37.7 (±6.4) 0.62
presence 19.0 (±1.6) 16.6 (±2.9) 0.72
acceptance 23.4 (±3.0) 21.1 (±4.2) 0.45
SCL-90R GSI 49.6 (±8.3) 50 (±10) −0.03
PSDI 46.9 (±8.1) 50 (±10) −0.24
PST 50.3 (±8.1) 50 (±10) 0.02
*N = 1,089 (see Blaser et al., 2014a,b). GSI, Global Severity Index; PSDI, Positive
Symptom Distress Index; PST, Positive SymptomTotal; STD, Standard Deviation.
Table 6 |The average number of the 16 participants with the
self-ratings for each task is listed.
Task Fulfillment self-rating
R ≤ 2 R = 2.5 or 3 R = 3.5 or 4 R = 4.5 or 5
IS 0 1.5 5 9.5
IF 0.5 1 6.5 8
OS 1.5 3 6 5.5
OF 0 4 6.5 5.5
EF 0 2.5 7 6.5
ES 0 3 5.5 7
IS 2 2,5 6 5.5
expected increase in beta activity did not reach signiﬁcance after
FDR adjustment, and decreased delta and theta could not be
conﬁrmed.
Increased alpha2 (z = 3.67, padj = 0.02) and beta band power,
with a predominance of beta2 (z = 2.79, padj = 0.023), was
visible in empathic connections with another person compared
to the extrapersonal location (EX-OX). This effect was espe-
cially strong in the object-oriented focus EF-OF, with signiﬁcantly
increased alpha2 (z = 2.69, padj = 0.034) and beta2 (z = 2.79,
padj = 0.023). The hypothesized increase in theta did not reach
signiﬁcance.
Attentional foci. Contrasting attentional foci revealed a different
picture, with the strongest and highly signiﬁcant differences in the
delta band for the comparisons XF-XS (z = 3.10, padj = 0.017),
IF-IS (z = 2.95, padj = 0.019) and OF-OS (z = 3.00, padj = 0.019).
This would conﬁrm the hypothesis (H3) of an increase in delta
in the externally directed foci, which would reduce DMN activity.
The change in the theta band did not reach signiﬁcance after FDR
adjustment, and the alpha and beta bands were not sensitive to the
attentional focus as hypothesized.
Relatedness. Taking both comparisons together, i.e., foci and loca-
tions, constitutes the category relatedness. Here, an outside
mental location with the focus on an external object (OF) showed
increased delta band activity (z = 2.90, padj = 0.021) and decreased
alpha2 (z = −3.26, padj = 0.011) and predominantly beta2 activity
(z = −2.95, padj = 0.019) in contrast to an internal self-focused
mental awareness (IS), as shown in the second last row of Figure 2.
As suggested in hypothesis H4 we found a combination of the
correlates of IX-OX and XF-XS with signiﬁcant patterns in delta,
alpha2 and beta2 bands.
Processing mode. Clear similarities were visible between the cat-
egories relatedness and the processing mode. In the latter, only
the alpha2 band reached signiﬁcance after correction (z = −2.95,
padj = 0.019). The alpha decrease in cognitive modes could be
conﬁrmed, while a theta increase in cognitive modes and higher
gamma band activities in emotional processing, as proposed in
hypothesis H5, could not be found.
Inﬂuence of age and gender
Although the statistical power with 6 male subjects seems to be
quite small for detecting reliable gender differences we tested for
possible differences. A Kruskal–Wallis test on the global band
power differences across 16 comparisons and 7 frequency bands
did not show signiﬁcant differences between male and female par-
ticipants [χ2(df = 1) = 0.6, p = 0.44]. A separate analysis of each
frequency band also did not reveal signiﬁcant gender differences.
An ANCOVA with the confounding factor age was performed
on the effect sizes of power differences between tasks for 16 com-
parisons and seven bands. The ﬁndings show that the overall result
remains signiﬁcant after considering age as a confounding factor
(F = 5.42, p = 0.02). A correlation analysis using Spearman’s rank
correlation between age and the effects of 16 comparisons and
seven frequency bands revealed no signiﬁcant correlations after
FDR adjustment. Therefore, it can be concluded that age does not
play a signiﬁcant role in this context and hypothesis H6 holds true.
TOPOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES
Figure 3 displays topographic mappings from the three general
comparisons between the three mental locations (3a–c), the gen-
eral comparison of the object- versus self-directed focus (3d), the
“selﬂess” versus self-centered states (3e) and the contrast of cog-
nitive and affective processing (3f). A Wilcoxon signed rank test
with subsequent FDR adjustment of p-values at the level of elec-
trodes was calculated on the effects weighted with the fulﬁllment
self-rating. The resulting p-values were multiplied by the sign of
the corresponding z-values. The topographic maps thus show the
signiﬁcant signed p-values.
Mental locations
Comparisons of intrapersonal and extrapersonal tasks presented
highly signiﬁcant increases in the parieto-occipital and midfrontal
and prefrontal alpha and low beta PSD. In contrast, the high
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beta activity revealed a signiﬁcant increase in the medial-parietal
region. Other frequency bands did not show any noteworthy
changes. Similar but much weaker increases could be observed
when contrasting empathic connectedness and the extrapersonal
location for those three bands. In the high beta band the increase
was shifted toward right centro-parietal regions.
Attentional foci
Completely different spectral and topographic patterns resulted
from the comparisons between different foci of attention. Here,
signiﬁcant changes could be observed almost globally in the delta
band only.
Relatedness
The alteration of mental location and attentional focus in the com-
parison OF-IS led to the strongest differences in PSD. A global
increase in delta activity was accompanied by a decrease in the
frontal and lateralized temporal and parietal alpha2 band, as well
as a highly signiﬁcant lateralized beta2 decrease.
Processing modes
States which required cognitive processing showed decreased
activities in the posterior alpha2 and centroparietal beta2 bands.
DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that both mental locations and attentional
foci showed signiﬁcant characteristics in neurophysiological data
measured by 64 channels of EEG. Generally, we found that the
alpha2 and beta2 bands served as good indicators for (a) the dis-
tinction between intrapersonal (IX) and extrapersonal space (OX),
(b) the distinction between perspective taking (empathy; (EX) and
extrapersonal space (OX), (c) the distinction between “selﬂess”
and self-centered states, and (d) the distinction between affec-
tive and cognitive processing modes. The topographic similarities
suggest that those four polar categories seem to be represented by
similar neural mechanisms. In contrast, the delta band served
as an indicator for the distinction of attentional foci (object
vs. self). In the following it is attempted to use the results
for a clearer characterization of the concepts “intrapersonal,”
“extrapersonal,” “empathic,” “self-centered,” “selﬂess,” “cognitive
processing,”“affective processing,” and “focus of attention.”
MENTAL LOCATIONS
Intrapersonal (IX inTable 3 )
According to the instructions in the IAMEx, both the IS and
IF states represent a mindful, affective or emotional perception
of either a person’s own body or the environment. The intrap-
ersonal space therefore represents a ﬁrst-person perspective. In
contrast to the extrapersonal space we found signiﬁcantly higher
alpha2 band power over frontal brain areas and lateralized parietal
areas. According toVogeley and Fink (2003) the medial prefrontal,
medial parietal and lateral temporoparietal cortex is involved in
the ﬁrst-person perspective. The medial parietal cortex is related
to the viewpoint of the observing self. This may be supported
by our ﬁndings for the beta2 band. The results also ﬁt with the
ﬁndings of Knyazev (2013), who reported enhanced alpha oscil-
lations during self-referential cognitive processing and enhanced
beta activity in the postcentral gyrus while theta and delta activi-
ties were reduced in the superior frontal gyrus. However, we did
not ﬁnd any reduction in theta activity.
Higher left parietal alpha was also reported by Mu et al. (2008)
during pain empathy compared to processing of neutral stimuli.
Only small and non-signiﬁcant differences in the empathic states
(IF-EF) and the self-directed state were visible. Therefore, the
intrapersonal space could be interpreted as a self-experiencing or
even“self-empathic”process throughwhich theworld is perceived.
In considerable concordance with the highly signiﬁcant lateral-
ized centroparietal alpha2 effect, the experience of self-location
and hand ownership has been found to be related to bilateral sen-
sorimotor cortices and posterior parietal alpha increases as well
(Lenggenhager et al., 2011; Evans and Blanke, 2013).
Extrapersonal (OX inTable 3 )
The extrapersonal space represents a cognitive construct of the
world. It can also be thought of as a dissociated state which,
according to Damasio (1999), is characterized by an active inhibi-
tion of emotional activity in the medial prefrontal cortex, which is
essential for monitoring and modulation of emotions. In addition,
decreased power in frontal and parietal beta PSD (Figures 3A,C)
supports this theory. Those regions seem to be less activated when
subjects were located mentally in the extrapersonal space, which
is a cognitive space. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Gusnard
et al. (2001) and Raichle et al. (2001) showing those regions to be
activated during resting states.
Perspective taking (empathy; EX inTable 3 )
Taking over another person’s perspective is performed as a cogni-
tive and an affective empathic connection. The affective empathic
connection was found to be associated with activations in the infe-
rior frontal gyrus (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009), anterior insular
cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Lamm and Singer,
2010). Unfortunately, subcortical activities are usually not visible
onEEG. Lammet al. (2007) associated activations in the right pari-
etal cortex with the adoption of another person’s perspective. This
is in line with our highly signiﬁcant right parietal beta2 increase in
the comparison of EX and OX. These EEG ﬁndings are also sup-
ported by Baars et al. (2003), who found heightened fMRI activity
in medial parietal, inferior lateral parietal and prefrontal cortical
areas when participants were asked to adopt the visual perspective
of another person. Findings as reported by Lamm et al. (2007) in
an fMRI study showing that the left parietal cortex demonstrated
higher activity in the self-perspective, whereas the right parietal
cortex was associated with the adoption of another’s perspective,
could not be demonstrated with our method. The fact that often
subcortical structures in the parietal cortex seem to distinguish
between the perspective of the self and that of another person
might explain the small and non-signiﬁcant changes between IX
and EX.
Sadaghiani et al. (2010) stated that alpha2 band activity was
positively correlated with activations of the dorsal anterior cin-
gulate cortex, anterior insula, anterior prefrontal cortex and
thalamus. This is in line with the increased interoceptive aware-
ness in IX, attributed in particular to the anterior insula. In a study
by Foxe et al. (1998), enhanced alpha synchronization was also
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attributed to selective attention and was proposed to reﬂect disen-
gaged anticipatory activities, while active anticipation reduced the
alpha oscillations. This would indicate that the enhanced alpha
activity in the intrapersonal location might suppress the ﬂood of
information that other perspectives would require, and the inside
view would therefore be the simplest.
FOCUS OF ATTENTION
Object- versus self-directed attention
With regard to the detection of EEG correlates of self-referential
processes, the in-depth review of Knyazev (2013) mentions that
delta and theta oscillations (most prominently in frontal midline
regions) correlate negatively with activity in the DMN. We found
highly signiﬁcant global delta activations in the object-directed
attention task, indicating inhibition of the DMN during XF tasks.
According to Knyazev (2012) higher delta activity during “self-
less” states suggest that the basic homeostatic and motivational
processes are rather object-related states without the necessity
of a self-construct. It seems important to note that alpha2 does
not seem to be sensitive to the attentional focus but is strongly
responsive to the mental location.
RELATEDNESS
“Selﬂess” versus self-centered
As can be seen in Figure 3, the contrast of a “selﬂess” state, i.e.,
an object-oriented external perspective, and a“self-centered”state,
i.e., a self-oriented intrapersonal perspective, displayed the most
prominent differences in the delta, alpha2, and beta2 bands. The
relatedness concept represents a combinationof location and focus
alterations, and in fact the physiological results also tend to show a
combination of the results between IX-OX and XF-XS. This sup-
ports the idea that self-centeredness can be neurophysiologically
separated into the aspect of intrapersonal mental connectedness
and a self-directed attentional focus. The ﬁndings suggest that
“selﬂessness” and self-centeredness might be intellectually and
physiologically relevant concepts. Most of the differences are in
line with the ﬁndings of other research groups. We found higher
right frontotemporal delta power in “selﬂess” states compared to
self-centered states. The OF state may also be related to a dissoci-
ated state. Dissociation has often been associated physiologically
with the temporal lobe (Bob, 2003), which in our study showed
increased slow waves and decreased fast frequencies compared to
a self-centered state. The increased delta activity was accompa-
nied by decreased bihemispheric frontal, central and parietal beta2
power, suggesting decreased processing in this region. Wheeler
et al. (1997) reported that in some cases lesions in the right fron-
totemporal cortex led to the experience of cognitive detachment
from the self. Interestingly, the contrast of “selﬂess” with self-
centered shows a very similar picture, especially with regard to
alpha and beta bands, to the contrast between“thoughtless empti-
ness” and a state of presence referred to as open monitoring as
measured in a study with 30 meditators (Hinterberger et al., 2014).
In fact, the state of being present in the moment with an aware-
ness of the physical space of the body represents the IS state, while
pure observation of an object from outside (the instruction in
the OF state did not ask for cognitive thoughts about the object)
might come close to a non-attached thoughtless state. The contrast
between visual perception and self-reference is strongly visible in
the left and right fronto-centro-parietal beta2 decreases. These lat-
eralized effects could indicate visual information processing in the
ventral stream,which is related to object recognition (Goodale and
Milner, 1992; Brown, 2009). In contrast, an association between
self-reference and activation in cortical midline structures (e.g.,
Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004) was not visible here.
PROCESSING MODE
Affective versus cognitive processing
In psychology and neurosciencewe ﬁnd a distinction between cog-
nitive and emotional or affective processing. Damasio (1999) has
summarized the ﬁndings in relation to the mechanisms of affec-
tive processing. He describes emotions as the basis for the self and
the self-model. Newen and Vogeley (2007) suggest that the neural
correlates of the ﬁrst-person perspective are associated with the
medial prefrontal and parietal cortex and the temporo-parietal
junction. These are deactivated when subjects perform cognitive
tasks (Raichle et al., 2001) and could represent an indicator for
affective versus cognitive mental states. The affective modes IS, IF,
and ES require a sensorily driven sense of body ownership, which
has been found to be associatedwith activations inmidline cortical
structures (Tsakiris et al., 2010). These modes present increased
beta2 power in central areas, as visible in Figure 3F. Decreases
in parietal and occipital alpha in cognitive modes become plau-
sible due to the fact that cognitive modes require more visual
information processing while self-perception promotes the visual
alpha rhythm. Our ﬁndings for the alpha2 band are in line with
the cognitive reduction as reported by Klimesch (1996, 1999) and
Ramos et al. (1993). Ramos et al. (1993) also found the decreased
beta during cognitive tasks. The affective enhancement of poste-
rior alpha is in line with Uusberg et al. (2013). The right frontal
gamma increase as reported by Müller et al. (1999) could not be
observed. Despite this close link between affective processing and
the self, the distinction between affective and cognitive modes as
shown in Figure 3F presents similar effects, albeit not as strong,
to the comparison between the “selﬂess” and self-centered mode.
The delta contrast is also less pronounced. This raises the question
whether the categories self-centered versus“selﬂess”processing are
physiologically more pronounced in the EEG and possibly more
relevant in terms of brain processing than the categories cognitive
versus affective.
TASK DIFFICULTY
As we were measuring objective physiological correlates of sub-
jective mental tasks the validity of our ﬁndings depends on the
actual performance of each task. We attempted to assess this indi-
vidually for each task using a task fulﬁllment self-rating score. In
this analysis we have decided to include the self-rating scores as a
weighting factor in the effect sizes of each task, assuming that this
would lead to results with a higher validity. Actually, the weighted
results did not differ from the non-weighted results with regard to
the essential ﬁndings.
The observation that the ﬁrst two intrapersonal modes were
more reliably achieved than the following modes supports the idea
that these might reﬂect well-trained networks such as the DMN.
Cognitive states and perspective taking might be harder to achieve
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as they require the performance of dual tasks, namely (a) the pro-
jectionof one’s ownviewpoint to an external place or to an external
person and (b) answering questions about the attentional focus.
The fact that the ﬁnal IS mode was much more difﬁcult to achieve
than the initial one suggests that task fulﬁllment depends on the
previous task. Gundel and Wilson (1992) showed that higher task
difﬁculty resulted in the reduction of parietal and occipital alpha
activity due to the amount of visual scanning as well as an increase
in theta activity in the left frontal electrodes, which they hypothe-
size to be associatedwith the amount of generalmental processing.
This might further support the signiﬁcant parietal and occipital
alpha2 increase in the contrasts IX-OX and EX-OX because the
OX tasks involve multitasking situations and were reported to be
the most difﬁcult ones and therefore are expected to show reduced
alpha.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The sequence of the tasks was ﬁxed, and therefore we do not
know how well the EEG changes can be transferred to other
sequences. It can be assumed that there is a signiﬁcant carryover
effect between tasks, which becomes visible when comparing the
initial and ﬁnal IS modes, as they were spectrally and topograph-
ically different. Therefore, these results may only be valid for the
IAMEx sequence used here and may not be generalizable. For this,
a further replication of this study concept with randomized task
sequences would be necessary. Further, associations of EEG ﬁnd-
ings with fMRI results should be treated with care, and probably
a LORETA analysis of our data would provide a more robust basis
for such interpretations. For a replication of this study we would
suggest the use of fMRI directly. Finally, the limited number of
participants also calls into question the robustness of the results.
CONCLUSION
We presented a spatial model of different forms of interpersonal
perception, and our results conﬁrm the neurophysiological dis-
criminability of three mental locations and two attentional foci.
The model of interpersonal attention management which served
as the basis for this study seems to provide a useful concept for
research in the domain of consciousness science. Different mental
perspectives such as intrapersonal positions, cognitive and affec-
tive extrapersonal positions, and empathic connectedness were
consciously occupied and could be related to speciﬁcEEGpatterns.
It is likely that depressive patients and patients with a clear
psychiatric diagnosis but also with psychotic symptoms such as
hallucinogenic experiences differ in their ability to access these
differentmental positions and attentional foci.We further hypoth-
esize that people with dissociative disorders or depressive episodes
have difﬁculties with the free choice of and transition between
mental locations. A further study with a clinical sample may
therefore demonstrate that such patients present smaller contrasts
between the tasks of the IAMEx. The IAMEx in combination with
physiological measurements could therefore serve as a diagnostic
tool. The IAMEx itself could serve as an exercise for psychosomatic
rehabilitation. Further, the data suggest that via the presented
exercises individuals could learn to generate brainwaves in speciﬁc
frequency bands at will. This suggests the possible development
of a neurofeedback device to train attentional and intra- and
interpersonal ﬂexibility for therapeutic and recreational purposes.
Individuals who have difﬁculty empathizing with others could
probably also proﬁt from these methods.
We have presented data showing the neurophysiological dis-
tinction between concepts of intrapersonal versus extrapersonal
mental space, “selﬂess” versus self-centered mental states, and
cognitive versus affective processing. All three conceptual duali-
ties showed very similar EEG PSD patterns in their comparisons.
Although the category cognitive versus affective might be the most
well-known differentiation in psychology it did not present the
strongest effects. The most prominent differences, in the “self-
less” versus self-centered contrast, showed a combination of the
results in the location- and focus-dependent contrasts. This sug-
gests that both the mental location and the attentional focus play
a fundamental role in brain processes related to the self-concept
and that they could be distinguished in the present study with
respect to brain oscillations. Thus, the attentional focus and the
so-called mental location seem to provide physiologically rele-
vant categories because the contrast between intrapersonal and
extrapersonal location displayed signiﬁcantly different EEG pat-
terns compared to the contrast between self- and object-directed
attentional focus. At this point, we would like to raise the follow-
ing philosophical question: what is the relationship between the
mental concept of subjective experience and the concepts or terms
we use to describe the organization and function of the brain?
This seems to be an important question as our mental categories
are essentially responsible for the interpretation of physiological
ﬁndings and thus formour picture of themechanisms of the brain.
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